Peter Liberman

pliberman
Position: Deputy Executive Officer
Campus Affiliation: Graduate Center|Queens College
Phone: 212-817-8670
Room Number: 5202.02
Office Hours: Fall 2016 (Tuesdays, 3:00pm-5:00pm)
Degrees/Diplomas: BA Reed College, PhD MIT
Research Interests: International security, military occupations and empire, military strategy, nuclear proliferation, foreign policy opinion, and political psychology
Peter Liberman teaches courses in security studies and international politics. He is currently working on a book on retribution in public support for state violence (including the use of military force and torture) and in political decision-making. He has published articles on this subject in International Organization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Public Opinion Quarterly, and Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. His earlier research has addressed nuclear proliferation and the political economy of security, including a book on military occupations, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, 1996). His work has been supported by the National Science Foundation, Time Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences, the Carnegie Corporation, and other foundations. Liberman is serving as Deputy Executive Officer of the CUNY Graduate Center’s Political Science Program 2015-16, is an Adjunct Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Saltzman Insitute of War and Peace Studies, and is a member of the editorial board of the journal Security Studies.

Books

liberman conquest payPeter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Societies (Princeton, 2012).

Can foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the “cumulativity” of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis.

Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman’s argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany’s capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France’s seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89.

Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international system is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman’s findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.

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