How do military alliances affect state repression and dissents? While previous works have studied the impact of international agreements and humanitarian advocacy on human rights violations, they overlook the unintended consequences of international institutions such as military alliances. Since military alliances are a credible commitment and shows support for the government from allies, it should change the strategic calculations of the government and dissenters. We argue that a country’s state repression is more likely and social movements are less likely when the treaty of military alliances has an article on its ally’s intervention in internal affairs as well as military bases and economic aids. We test these hypotheses on state repression with a sample of the country-year from 1981-2011 by relying on the dataset of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) and the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Projects. Regarding social movements, we employ the formal tests of structural breaks on social conflicts in Africa. The results show that provisions on intervention and economic aids could worsen human rights conditions, though those on military bases are inconsequential. On the other hand, we cannot find evidence for the effect of the formation of the African Union on the number of social conflicts. This study suggests that scholars in human rights should investigate a more diverse set of international agreements