

**Message in a Battle:
Preliminary Findings on Narco-messages and the Legibility of Violence**

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This paper is a little different from the usual CPW fare, in that it is not intended for publication. Rather, it is a summary of my dissertation project to date – a sort of rewrite of my dissertation proposal, now that I have a solid base of data. I will use this paper as the template for fellowship and grant proposals, the deadlines for which are looming. The paper is currently too long for a proposal, but the idea is to mix and match sections of the paper, in line with the specific requirements of each application.

At the end of the paper, I have added some summary material from my database. The sprawling spreadsheet is a summary of all narco-messages, broken down by year and state. I have included total number of narco-messages, as well as the number of messages found in the immediate vicinity of a corpse. After the table comes figures for the national total, as well as for the eight states which recorded over 300 narco-messages between 2004 and 2013.

I don't directly reference this material in the paper, and it wouldn't be included in any proposal. I include it for the sake of giving a sense of the material I am working with, and in case I am missing anything very obvious. As you will see in the paper, I haven't yet specified a second case study, but I need to do so soon, and this extra material gives some idea of my options. Scrutinize or disregard it as you will.

Thank you for reading. I look forward to discussing this project with the CPW.

Introduction

In early 2005, two bodies were found on the side of a highway in the Mexican border city of Reynosa. While this was an increasing common occurrence in the area at the time, one unusual feature distinguished this crime scene; by the bodies was a sheet of cardboard, upon which was written, “For Chapo Guzman... and those that help him.” In 2009, in the city of Cuernavaca, a banner appeared overnight on the wall of a kindergarten. Addressed to an infamous assassin, the banner declared, “You have my complete support to start a war here.” In 2011, 19 young men were killed at a church-run rehab clinic in Chihuahua city. The killers left scrawled messages at the scene, including one that said, “This is what happens to pigs, rats, kidnapers, murderers, rapists, and extortionists.” These three events are examples of what is known in Mexico as a narco-message. Since the earliest cases in late 2004 and early 2005, thousands of such messages have appeared throughout the country. The increased appearance of narco-messages roughly follows the increase in levels of violence in Mexico, but as the above examples indicate, not every act of violence is accompanied by a message, nor do messages only appear in the immediate vicinity of violence.

There are several puzzling features of this phenomenon. Many theories of violence emphasize its coercive, communicative nature, treating violence as an effective form of messaging or signaling. The appearance of written messages either in the presence of, or which make reference to, acts of violence challenges the supposed effectiveness of violence as communication. An obvious explanation for the use of written messages is that threats and warnings can substitute for acts of violence, achieving the same coercive effect at a lower overall cost. If this were the case in Mexico, we should see narco-messages replace direct violence, whereas in fact we see messages proliferating with violence. The starting proposition of this

project is that the legibility of violence varies. In certain contexts, the meaning of violence becomes particularly difficult to read, and thus the perpetrators (although not necessarily only the perpetrators) will utilize tactics intended to fix the public's understanding of violence. The overarching question of this project is thus: when and why does the meaning of violence become illegible, and how is the meaning of violence re-asserted?

Mexico constitutes an interesting case through which to explore the question of legibility and meaning, because narco-messages offer both a clear and well-documented social phenomenon, as well as a great deal of local variation within this phenomenon. The steady increase in the appearance of these messages also suggests that their authors believe the messages are fulfilling a strategic function. The case is also an urgent one, given the high (and at time of writing, rising) levels of violence in Mexico. Despite the attentions of successive administrations and substantial U.S. support, no security policy has met with any sustainable success, in terms of violence reduction. To better understand narco-messages, this project addresses three specific questions. First, why did narco-messages start to appear in late 2004 and early 2005, and subsequently spread nationally? Second, why does the appearance of narco-messages spike in different areas; what logic accounts for the both the sharp increase, and later decrease, in use of messages? Third, what do narco-messages actually communicate, at both the level of individual messages, and in the aggregate? In addressing these questions, the project creates and analyzes a database of narco-messages for the years 2004 to 2013 (inclusive), and supplements this research with interviews.

Contributions of Study

This project makes scholarly contributions at different levels. Theoretically, the project joins a growing body of scholarship that examines the public reception and interpretation of violence (Goldstein, 2004; Fujii, 2017; Duran-Martínez, 2018). To this field, the project adds analytic attention to the legibility of violence. In doing so it shifts the analytic focus onto local social dynamics, and to the question of who exactly is the target and audience of violence. This is a particularly urgent agenda for Latin America, where the end of political conflicts has seen increases in the use of spectacular violence by a wide spectrum of armed groups, including paramilitaries, death squads, vigilantes, and local and transnational gangs.

Empirically, this project creates the most comprehensive database of narco-messages to date, and offers the first evidence that these messages pre-date the formal beginning of the “war on drugs” in Mexico in December 2006. Methodologically, the project puts the written text of armed groups under the microscope. Drawing upon both interpretive and positivist methods, the project develops a comprehensive research agenda that attends to the complexities and ambiguities of written text. With renewed scholarly attention to the documents produced by and about armed groups (Balcells & Sullivan, 2018) – including overdue attention to the written material of criminal groups (Skarbeck & Wang, 2015; Pereda, 2018) – the development of such an interdisciplinary agenda is particularly timely.

This topic also has important implications for both Mexican and U.S. policy. Throughout the 21st century, Mexico has taken a militarized approach to countering violent crime in the country. Although many criminal leadership targets have been killed or arrested, this has produced no lasting decrease in levels of violence. This project proposes a more localized and socially-grounded approach to understanding dynamics of violence. From this perspective, the prevailing diagnoses of the type of violence unfolding in Mexico appear to be completely wrong.

For U.S. policy, this invites a paradigm shift. To date the U.S. has invested over \$1 billion in Mexican security through the Mérida Initiative, primarily in the form of military assistance and development (Olson, 2017). As this project demonstrates, however, the U.S. appears to be fighting the wrong battle, by privileging militarization and state security over violence reduction and human security.

Theory

The assertion that violence is an effective form of communication for armed groups is near ubiquitous in studies of conflict and social control. In absolutist regimes, spectacles of violence are used to reaffirm sovereignty and the law (Foucault, 1995), while clandestine terrorist groups use public acts of violence to broadcast their agenda (Crenshaw, 1981). Public violence is a costly, credible signal of the group's capacity and commitment, with brutal violence often assumed to send a stronger signal (Gambetta, 2009). Suicide missions thus constitute the most extreme, but also effective, such message (Feldman, 1991; Gambetta, 2005). This overall interpretation emphasizes the coercive capacity of violence, above and beyond its brute, destructive face (Schelling, 1970).

A vast body of scholarship, however, addresses the ambiguity and uncertainty involved in all communication – from a gesture as simple as a wink (Geertz, 1973), to complex works of literature (Barthes, 1977). Even if violence increases the credibility of a signal, this is no guarantee that the signal will be understood in its entirety, and as intended. Indeed, Machiavelli counsels that violence must be intelligible to its intended audience, if an aspiring ruler is to be feared but not hated (2005), while Kalyvas argues that the distinction between the optimal strategy of selective violence and the sub-optimal strategy of indiscriminate violence is

ultimately determined by the understanding of the local audience (2006). Both theorists thus emphasize legibility, a concept used by Scott to indicate the degree to which a social process appears as rational and understandable (1998). Where Scott writes on legibility from the point of view of the state, my project is concerned with local legibility, and whether violence can be understood in its social context.

Violence is more likely to be legible when it is deployed in accord with local values or understandings. Machiavelli offers specific examples of acts of violence likely to provoke outcry from local subjects (2005). The violence and criminality of the social bandit is tolerated or supported by society, because it is rooted in local values and relations (Hobsbawm, 1981). Similarly, a moral economy can provide a local rubric for understanding violence that would otherwise make little rational, individual-level sense (Thompson, 1971; Scott, 1977; Rodgers, 2015). Such violence is often described as following a local script or transcript (Scott, 1990), or as a codified spectacle or display (Goldstein, 2004; Fujii, 2017). Armed groups are more likely to be able to engage with such local customs and understandings when they know and are known by society (Feldman, 1991). This idea of mutual recognition can be traced back to Aristotle, for whom the ideal political community is one in which citizens survey and recognize all other members of the community (1995). Where this mutual recognition – and the sense of security and certainty that it brings – breaks down, violence is sometimes used to reassert order, but this is also likely to be violence at its most brutal and illegible (Appadurai, 1998; Taussig, 2005).

The sharp increase in violence – both in terms of frequency and brutality (Phillips, 2018; Duran-Martínez, 2018) – in Mexico since about 2007 has drawn considerable scholarly attention (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). While this violence is frequently associated with the declaration of a war on crime by President Calderón (Astorga, 2015), the roots of the violence lie in shifts in

criminal organization resulting from incremental democratic transition in the 90s, leading up to 2000 and the first change of presidential power in over 70 years (Snyder & Duran-Martínez, 2009; Rios, 2015; Trejo & Ley, 2017). The paramilitarization of criminal groups, in combination with the state security policy of militarization (and decapitation of the leadership of criminal groups) has caused the fragmentation of major criminal organizations, and an accompanying diffusion of violence beyond zones associated with trafficking (Calderón et al, 2015; Osorio, 2015; Phillips, 2015).

From a regional perspective, the violence in Mexico appears in a somewhat different light. Levels of violence in Mexico are significantly lower than some Central American and Caribbean countries, and regions of Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. Several commentators have thus suggested that it is not violence itself that distinguishes the country, so much as the style of terrorization, and the degree of media dissemination of violence (Meade, 2017; Guerrero, 2018). A growing field of scholarship thus examines the visibility and performativity of violence in Mexico (Villareal, 2015; Duran-Martínez, 2018), as well as the interaction between media production and violence (Piccato, 2014; Atuesta, 2017). Further work focuses on the social relations between crime and wider society (Ernst, 2015), as part of broader scholarly agenda that examines criminal governance in the region (Arias, 2017).

Research Agenda

When and why does the meaning of violence become illegible, and how is the meaning of violence re-asserted? Taking narco-messages as a tactic used in contexts in which the meaning of violence is particularly illegible, this project analyzes the appearance of these messages, in order

to understand variation in the legibility of violence. To do so, the project focuses on three specific research questions.

Why did narco-messages start to appear in late 2004 and early 2005, and why did they spread nationally? This question calls for a descriptive, national-level survey of the overall phenomenon. The key variation to explain is longitudinal: why did narco-messages appear when they did, in locations in which they had never previously existed? The earliest messages appeared in 2004 in the northeast of Mexico; by 2008, narco-messages had appeared in 28 of 32 states. This first stage of analysis provides the overall conditions in which the legibility of violence breaks down, and tactics to re-assert the meaning of violence are deployed. It details the general contours of the phenomenon, but does not address local variation within the phenomenon.

Why does the appearance of narco-messages spike in different areas; what logic accounts for the sharp increase, and later decrease, in use of messages? This question builds on the first; once messages have appeared as an available repertoire within a local area, what causes a rapid uptick in their use? To address this question, the project undertakes a comparative analysis of several state-level cases. The spikes in narco-message appearance are more localized than the level of the state, but selecting cases at the level of the city would introduce an obvious urban bias, while selecting at the level of the municipality would be too localized; spikes of messages often cluster across several municipalities. This analysis thus searches for local factors that trigger an outcome of sufficient magnitude to be visible at the state level. I will use process-tracing, supplemented by some text analysis, to identify the causal mechanisms at work here.

The first case study will focus on Morelos state. Several features of narco-messages in the state are of interest. First, messages remained virtually absent in Morelos, even as they

appeared with greater frequency nationally. Second, when messages started to appear, they spiked far more sharply than in the rest of the country; they increased more rapidly than the national trend, and then decreased while the national trend was for further increase. Finally, the state has an unusually high proportion of messages without accompanying corpses. Morelos is also an interesting case because it is not an area traditionally associated with drug-trafficking or high levels of violence. I have not yet settled on a second case.

What do narco-messages communicate? Whereas the previous two questions address the conditions under which meaning becomes illegible, this question focuses on how meaning is re-asserted through messages. It thus requires a careful analysis of the language of these texts. While we cannot take narco-messages as unproblematic assertions of fact, the frequency with which messages appear and the highly generic content of the messages allow for a structural analysis of the “grammar of motives” revealed in these texts (Burke, 1945). Furthermore, my interviews provide insight into the extent to which the intended meaning of narco-messages is successfully transmitted as the received meaning of the messages. The analysis will thus examine: the grammatical framing of violence; naming and attribution conventions; who is addressed in messages and how; ~~the extent to which messages ‘speak’ to one another, forming dialogues~~. While certainly worth exploring in its own right, this question should also provide support for the previous one; the identified logic/s of violence that explain spikes in message appearance should find correspondence with the language used in the messages.

Data Collection (so far)

Field research for this project commenced with a preliminary investigation in the summer of 2017, and continued with data collection for the base of narco-messages throughout the spring

and summer of 2018. During this visit to Mexico, I also conducted interviews in Mexico City and Cuernavaca (capital of Morelos state). In 2019, research will focus on developing case studies, and conducting further interviews.

Data collection for the database involved two stages. First, I collected data from online media archives. Second, I cross-checked the data from media sources with data from a government source. During preliminary research, I focused on identifying media sources that reported widely on narco-messages, and that offered accessible, searchable archives. This also involved testing various search terms: different newspapers and authors use slightly different terms for reporting on messages, and different search functions require slightly different queries. The main newspaper sources used for data collection were: *Diario de Coahuila*, *Mural*, *Noroeste*, *El Norte*, *Proceso*, *Siglo de Torreón*, *El Sur de Acapulco*, *La Unión de Morelos*, *Tabasco Hoy*, and *Zeta Tijuana*. I collected data for the years from 2004 to 2013. A complete data point includes the following information: date, state, municipality, exact location (if available), number of bodies at site, transcription of message content in its original language (Spanish, but hardly formal Spanish), apparent author, contextual details (e.g. was the message left outside a school, or a government building?), media sources. Not all information was available for every data point.

This is the most comprehensive database of narco-messages available, but there are almost certainly still some messages not included in the base. To get some sense of any biases involved in the use of media sources, I cross-checked this database with another, which had previously been the most comprehensive available (Atuesta, 2017). This second database covers early 2007 until late 2011, but only tracks narco-messages found at the scene of a homicide. The publicly available version of this database does not include message transcriptions. Importantly,

the database was composed by government agencies, and thus would not be subject to the same biases as media sources. The comparison of databases demonstrated that neither source was comprehensive, and that each base was missing many points present in the other. I therefore merged the two databases, capturing all of the data points yielded by media or government sources. The overall result of data collection is a base of some 6,180 points.

Preliminary Findings and Hypothesis

While I am still in the early stages of analysis, and plan to collect further data, my preliminary observations suggest a starting hypothesis. The shift towards paramilitarization of criminal organizations in Mexico in the early 2000s led to new modes of contestation and control of territory by armed groups. These new modes of control disrupt local social order, generating uncertainty and insecurity, such that increasing levels of violence also became increasingly difficult to understand. At the same time, the increased contestation of territory by armed groups made the legibility of violence more important, precisely as it was becoming harder to affirm. Narco-messages are an easy – but not necessarily effective – tactic through which armed groups and other actors try to impose their own interpretation on local violence. Some preliminary findings from each of the three research questions, all of which support this hypothesis, are outlined below.

The earliest narco-messages appear in late 2004, and begin to constitute an ongoing social phenomenon in the northeastern state of Tamaulipas. These messages refer to the encroachment of the Sinaloa Cartel (based in the western state of the same name) into the territory of the Gulf Cartel and their armed wing, the Zetas. This was the first sustained attempt by a major drug-trafficking organization to usurp a rival's traditional territory (Grillo, 2011).

Although major criminal organizations began mobilizing private militias in the late 90s (Trejo & Ley, 2017), the Sinaloa Cartel's campaign was the first instance of these militias becoming sufficiently mobile to actively contest distant territory – a shift from defensive to offensive paramilitarism. As the “war” between Sinaloa and the Gulf expanded, narco-messages appeared in other contested states: Nuevo León, Guerrero and Sinaloa in 2005. The messages did not spread state by state, but rather appeared wherever these mobile armed groups violently contested territory. The role of the Zetas is noteworthy; this was the first criminal group recruited primarily from elite military units, bringing strategy and tactics usually associated with state counterinsurgency into the criminal field in Mexico (Grayson & Logan, 2012). The first concerted campaign of narco-messages came in Michoacán in late 2006, as a previously obscure group associated with the Zetas, the *Familia Michoacana*, declared its dominion over the state. Thereafter, narco-messages spread rapidly, appearing in more than half of the 32 federal entities in 2007, and in all but 4 in 2008. The paramilitarization of crime created conditions under which violence was less legible because armed groups were no longer rooted in a local context. These groups were highly mobile, and willing to deploy and display violence publicly. Territories that had long be under the exclusive domain of a single cartel were suddenly contested by new groups from outside. In line with counterinsurgency practice throughout the region, these groups also tended to control territory through terror, rather than legitimacy building.

This trend of paramilitarism created local conditions in which the meaning of violence was not readily legible, and spawned a generally available tactic for countering this illegibility. The case of Morelos demonstrates how, within these general conditions, sudden shifts in the local criminal order trigger sharp increases in the appearance of narco-messages. Narco-messages were a rare occurrence in Morelos until the very end of 2009, when one of the

country's most famous crime figures was killed by Mexican marines just outside of the state capital. Leadership decapitation of this kind increases insecurity and violence generally, but the messages appearing in Morelos suggest that the specific mechanism of relevance here was that a shift in the criminal order led to increased contestation, and thus to a greater strategic value for armed groups in imposing their own interpretation on spiraling violence.

A preliminary review of the language of narco-messages raises several interesting points. Firstly, narco-messages very rarely threaten state institutions, or federal-level politicians. To the extent that messages threaten government figures, these are usually municipal officials, or locally-stationed police and military figures. The president of Mexico is often addressed in messages, but nearly always in conciliatory terms, and often with the apparent authors of the message aiming to situate themselves as allies or aides to the president. This suggests that these groups strive to dominate the local, criminal order, while leaving the social order at the national level untouched – a pattern of violence more akin to paramilitarism than “criminal insurgency” (Grillo, 2011; Kalyvas, 2015). Secondly, many messages offer a basic logic according to which people have or will be killed. These messages justify murder as a form of social cleansing or extralegal punishment, aimed at maintaining local order by targeting various categories of undesirables. Most messages, then, are concerned less about distancing groups from violence, and more about justifying violence based on the target. Finally, often in the names with which messages are signed, and frequently throughout the languages of the messages, the authors make claims to represent or pursue justice. Messages are sometimes signed with names like “the Just Ones” or “the Village United,” or claim to be based in and to speak for a local community. This language casts armed groups in the style of self-defense or vigilante organization, and again justifies the use of violence with a favorable meaning. If paramilitary-style groups tend to use

terror to contest and control territory, the language of these messages aims to provide a gloss of legitimacy to terrorizing violence.

These early observations point to a paradigm shift within criminal organization in Mexico as the start point for understanding when and why the meaning of violence in the country became particularly illegible, and open to contestation. These observations also demonstrate that efforts to reassert the meaning of violence tend to tap into longer regional traditions of vigilantism and social mobilization (Phillips, 2017; Santamaria, 2017; Moncada, 2017; Osorio, Schubiger & Weintraub, 2017). Such a strategy among paramilitary groups has been documented in other contexts, such as Colombia (Tate, 2010). Importantly, if this initial hypothesis proves accurate, it suggests the need to rethink security policy in Mexico. The two dominant paradigms for understanding violence in the country characterize armed groups in terms of transnational trafficking organizations, or as a criminal insurgency. Paramilitarism, however, involves a different set of dynamics of violence to either of these; one in which state security is never really threatened, but in which human security is of paramount importance.

Further Research

I expect to take two years to bring this project to a satisfactory conclusion. During the 2018-19 academic year, my focus will be on carefully reviewing my data to date. This will include cleaning the data already collected, and some supplementary data collection to attempt to fill in some of the blank spaces in the data. Filling in these blanks will be particularly important for analysis of the language of narco-messages. Complete message transcriptions are the hardest aspect of the data to find. There are two main means available for filling in the blank spaces: large media databases, such as *Infolatina* and *INPRO*; informal media sources such as narco-

blogs, and the more sensational tabloid media, locally known as the *nota roja*. The former approach will cast a much broader, but fairly imprecise net. The latter approach incorporates a lot of unreliable data, but also a lot of images from which message language can be transcribed. During this academic year I should also be able to write up draft chapters for the more descriptive components of the project, such as the examination of the emergence of narco-messages.

During the summer of 2019, I plan to return to Mexico, to collect more targeted data – especially interviews – for my case studies. At the very least, I plan to spend the summer conducting interviews. Depending on funding and teaching load, however, I hope to spend longer in the country, so that I have time to conduct more interviews. Given that I have several planned case studies, I will need as much time as possible to visit and recruit interviewees at each site. I have already started conducting interviews in Morelos state, so plan to start there and build on the work of the previous summer. The rest of the 2019-20 academic year will dedicated to analysis and writing.

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		Total	Unknown	Aguascalientes	Baja California	Baja California Sur	Campeche	Chiapas	Chihuahua	Coahuila	Colima	District of Federal Capital	Durango	Guanajuato	Guerrero	Hidalgo	Jalisco
2004	All	4															1
	W/ corpse	4															1
	%	100%															100%
2005	All	14										1			1		
	W/ corpse	13										1			0		
	%	93%										100%			0%		
2006	All	65										1			14		2
	W/ corpse	61										1			13		2
	%	94%										100%			93%		100%
2007	All	118		3	8				4			8	4		22	1	4
	W/ corpse	105		3	8				4			4	3		18	1	4
	%	89%		100%	100%				100%			50%	75%		82%	100%	100%
2008	All	773		10	38		4	9	94	25		6	50	22	58	5	8
	W/ corpse	343		2	37		1	3	63	6		4	26	8	28	5	6
	%	44%		20%	97%		25%	33%	67%	24%		67%	52%	36%	48%	100%	75%
2009	All	857	1	9	29			13	75	12	9	10	20	57	131	3	23
	W/ corpse	570	0	4	29			3	41	6	8	9	20	44	105	3	17
	%	67%	0%	44%	100%			23%	55%	50%	89%	90%	100%	77%	80%	100%	74%
2010	All	1507	2	8	20	1	1	1	128	34	12	26	58	60	151	5	129
	W/ corpse	1007	0	2	18	0	1	1	105	27	12	22	49	24	138	4	64
	%	67%	0%	25%	90%	0%	100%	100%	82%	79%	100%	85%	84%	40%	91%	80%	50%
2011	All	1560	2	11	13		3	4	137	82	6	12	48	43	368	13	102
	W/ corpse	1136	0	11	13		1	4	81	64	6	11	36	28	310	13	73
	%	73%	0%	100%	100%		33%	100%	59%	78%	100%	91%	75%	65%	84%	100%	72%
2012	All	891	2		4				9	52	5	4	7	95	209	8	75
	W/ corpse	418	0		0				5	21	3	2	4	0	136	6	40
	%	47%	0%		0%				56%	40%	60%	50%	57%	0%	65%	75%	53%
2013	All	389			14			1	9	85		9	9	1	24	3	12
	W/ corpse	146			1			1	4	13		6	1	1	15	3	11
	%	38%			7%			100%	44%	15%		67%	11%	100%	63%	100%	92%
Total	All	6180	7	41	126	1	8	28	456	290	32	77	196	278	978	38	356
	W/ corpse	3803	0	22	106	0	3	12	303	137	29	60	139	105	763	35	218
	%	62%	0%	54%	84%	0%	38%	43%	66%	47%	91%	78%	71%	38%	78%	92%	61%

México	Michoacán	Morelos	Nayarit	Nuevo León	Oaxaca	Puebla	Queretaro	Quintana	San Luis P.	Sinaloa	Sonora	Tabasco	Tamaulipas	Tlaxcala	Veracruz	Yucatan	Zacatecas
	1 1 100%												2 2 100%				
				6 6 100%						1 1 100%			5 5 100%				
1 1 100%	37 36 97%			6 5 83%						2 1 50%		1 1 100%	1 1 100%				
1 1 100%	11 11 100%	1 1 100%		9 9 100%	1 1 100%			4 4 100%		12 8 67%	2 2 100%	6 6 100%	6 6 100%		11 11 100%		
36 31 86%	31 20 65%	5 2 40%	1 1 100%	37 3 8%	12 5 42%	5 1 20%		8 2 25%	12 4 33%	90 44 49%	19 10 53%	37 5 14%	65 7 11%		49 10 20%	10 7 70%	27 2 7%
53 50 94%	89 67 75%	50 13 26%		11 2 18%	6 1 17%	4 3 75%		2 2 100%		98 74 76%	51 33 65%	28 1 4%	16 4 25%		55 29 53%		2 2 100%
100 98 98%	89 64 72%	174 70 40%	17 16 94%	51 24 47%	9 8 89%	1 0 0%	2 0 0%	22 5 23%	9 5 56%	211 157 74%	20 17 85%	34 19 56%	82 44 54%		47 11 23%		3 2 67%
84 84 100%	159 56 35%	54 45 83%	25 25 100%	168 126 75%	13 12 92%	4 1 25%	1 0 0%	10 9 90%	15 11 73%	61 35 57%	11 8 73%	24 18 75%	53 37 70%		19 16 84%		15 2 13%
34 19 56%	57 12 21%	34 21 62%		145 100 69%	4 0 0%	2 0 0%	1 0 0%	4 4 100%	21 7 33%	16 7 44%	10 3 30%	5 5 100%	21 11 52%		20 8 40%		47 4 9%
22 22 100%	24 10 42%	7 5 71%		41 14 34%	4 0 0%			6 6 100%	9 1 11%	32 7 22%		33 13 39%	20 6 30%		8 1 13%		16 5 31%
331 306 92%	498 277 56%	325 157 48%	43 42 98%	474 289 61%	49 27 55%	16 5 31%	4 0 0%	56 32 57%	66 28 42%	523 334 64%	113 73 65%	168 68 40%	271 123 45%	0 0 #DIV/0!	209 86 41%	10 7 70%	110 17 15%





